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This paper uses a labor supply model that incorporates waiting for health care to derive 
an empirical specification for sick leave and to estimate the impact of waiting for health 
care on the duration of sick leave. In the estimations, we use the 2002 sample of the 
RFV-LS  register  database,  supplemented  with  information  from  questionnaires.  The 
results  indicate  that  almost  all  waiting  for  health  care  variables  have  a  statistically 
significant positive impact on the duration of sick leave, and did not induce substantial 
changes on the impact of traditional variables of the labor supply model. 
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1 Introduction 
Work  absence  incurs  substantial  costs  for  employers,  workers,  and  public  finances.  For 
example, in Sweden, in the beginning of the 2000s, the amount of general government transfers 
related to sickness, including disability pensions (i.e., work absence covered by the sickness 
insurance), reached about 5% of GDP. The sickness insurance is designed such that payments 
depend on a basic evaluation procedure, which remains a (simple) medical evaluation and a 
doctor’s certification of illness after the first week, and then periodic reviews. This implies that 
sick leave accounts for part of the total health care expenditures, which amounted to about 9.2% 
of GDP in 2002.
1
 The earlier literature on sick leave is relatively rich, yet there is hardly any 
empirical  evidence on  how  health  care  "dependency",  like  waiting  times,  affects  individual 
work-absence behavior and/or the duration of sick leave. Waiting for health care can increase 
current absence, but since some work while waiting, it is not reasonable to expect a one-to-one 
relationship. Moreover, the time spent waiting for health care might have durable effects on 
patients’ health and affect future work absence. 
Some previous studies have found that economic incentives have a significant impact 
on individuals' work-absence behavior.
2 For example, Fenn (1981), Butler and Worrall (1985), 
and Johnson and Ondrich (1990) analyzed the duration of sick leave and showed that as the 
relative  generosity  of  sick  pay  (i.e.,  the  replacement  rate)  increased,  there  was  a  clear 
“disincentive” effect as the duration of sick leave increased. Other factors found to affect sick 
leave duration are wages, the type and severity of injury, the physical demand of the job, the 
willingness  of  employers  to  help  workers  return  to  work,  and  the  unemployment  rate.
3 A 
                                                 
1
 We report facts and institutional settings for the beginning of the 2000s, and especially 2002, which is 
the period of the data analyzed in this paper.  
2
 e.g., Allen (1981), Dunn and Youngblood (1986), Chaudhury and Ng (1992), Dalton and Mesch (1992), 
Drago and Wooden (1992), Barmby et al. (1991, 1995), Brown and Sessions (1996), Cassel et al. (1996), 
Johansson and Palme (1996, 2002, 2004), Johansson and Brännäs (1998), Gilleskie (1998), and Brown 
(1999). 
3
 e.g., Marklund (1995), Hammarström (1996), Selander et al. (1996a, 1996b), and Marklund and Lidwall 
(1997), Lidwall and Skogman Thoursie (2000), Larsson (2004), and Arai and Skogman Thousie (2004).  2 
   
Swedish report (SBU, 2003) claimed that a crucial factor for the high sick leave rate was the 
lack of efficient collaboration between the primary health care and the social insurance office, 
i.e., between the medical doctors, who assess the working capacity of insured individuals, and 
the case workers at the social security office, who make the decision on sickness benefits. Still, 




To  our  knowledge,  none  of  the  economic  studies  analyzing  duration  of  sick  leave 
incorporates in their model waiting times for health care (e.g., technical investigations, meeting 
a specialist, surgery, or other type of treatment). Not incorporating this might result in biased 
estimators for traditional variables like potential income and cost for absence, since there is 
evidence  that  socioeconomic  factors  are  associated  with  access  to  health  care  in  Sweden 
(Gerdtham,  1997;  Whitehead,  Evandrou,  Haglund,  and  Diderichsen,  1997;  Gerdtham  and 
Sundberg, 1998; Burström, 2002; Haglund, Köster, Nilsson, and Rosén, 2004; Van Doorslaer, 
Masseria and Koolman, 2006) and in many other developed countries (e.g., Van Doorslaer and 
Masseri, 2004; Van Doorslaer et al., 2000, 2004). 
The goal of the present study is to use a labor supply model that incorporates waiting 
for health care to derive an empirical specification for the duration of the sick leave. To do this, 
we use the 2002 sample of the register RFV-LS database, supplemented with information from 
questionnaires. We report both how controlling for other variables (including waiting time) 
affects the estimates for traditional labor supply variables on duration of sick leave, and how 
controlling for other variables (including traditional labor supply variables) affects the estimates 
for waiting time variables on duration of sick leave. Our results indicate that almost all waiting 
time variables have a relatively robust positive statistically significant impact on the duration of 
sick leave, and that these variables do not induce substantial changes in the impact of traditional 
                                                 
4
Granlund (in press) discussed that shorter waiting time could be one channel through which increased 
health care expenditure could reduce absence from  work due to sickness or disability, but  found no 
statistically significant effect of public health care expenditure of municipality-level absence. 3 
   
(economic and demographic) variables of a labor supply model. The estimation strategy is a 
descriptive one, so the estimates should not be interpreted as causal effects.    
The remainder  of this paper is arranged into six sections. Section 2 reviews earlier 
literature. Section 3 goes into detail about the institutional settings of sick leave and health care 
in Sweden. Section 4 presents our theoretical model, and the data and the empirical strategy are 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 contains the results, and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2 Earlier Literature 
In many public health care systems, treatments are rationed by waiting time. About one-third of 
the  sick-listed  individuals  in  a  Swedish  sample  reported  a  waiting  period  for  medical 
examinations, treatments or visits to a health care specialist; and among individuals who are 
sick-listed for musculoskeletal diseases and need surgery, 60% reported a waiting period of 
eight  weeks  or  longer  (Försäkringskassan,  2005).  Waiting  for  health  care  services  (from  a 
simple investigation to a general surgery) prolongs the period of decreased health and affects the 
psychological  and  social  life  of  the  patients  and  their  families  (Oudhoff  et  al.,  2007). 
Additionally, waiting for treatment might prolong sick leave. Anema et al., (2002) reported this 
for people with low back pain. Arrelöv et al. (2007) reported that both general practitioners and 
orthopedic surgeons in Sweden prolonged sickness certifications due to waiting times in health 
care  or  at  the  social  insurance  office.  Delayed  treatment  has  also  been  shown  in  many 
investigations  to  greatly  increase  the  risk  of  remaining  on  a  disability  pension  (Hurst  and 
Siciliani, 2003). 
The loss of earnings is often partially compensated through a sickness benefit scheme. 
This incurs a cost for the society at large in the form of increased tax distortions to fund the 
benefit schemes, in addition to the production loss due to absenteeism. With a long waiting 
time, these costs may by far exceed the direct medical expenses. Hagen and Østtveiten (1999) 
reported in an evaluation of a Norwegian project that used sickness benefits to procure non-
complicated health services that the average medical expenses equaled 14 days of sickness 4 
   
benefit  payments  (Hoel  and  Saether,  2003).  Similarly,  in  Finland,  the  costs  of  delayed 
treatments (sickness benefits, costs of medicines, social welfare expenses) for both the working 
population and pensioners exceed the costs of treatment, often very substantially. Hansson et al. 
(2003) computed the cost to society (in terms of loss of production) of having patients on paid 
sick-leave while on a waiting list for elective orthopedic surgery (lumbar disc herniation, lumbar 
spinal  stenosis,  and  certain  knee  and  shoulder  diagnoses,  not  including  arthritis).  These 
diagnoses were chosen since there is evidence that surgery can reduce pain and disability and 
also improve work ability. The costs for paid sick-leave together with future costs for those 
granted permanent disability pensions for 159 patients were almost SEK 90 million (almost 
USD 90 million, at the time of analysis). This amount corresponded to the cost of more than 
2,000 disc operations or more than 1,000 total hip replacements.  
The literature on socioeconomic inequality in health care utilization includes strong 
evidence that people with low socioeconomic status consume less health care relative to their 
needs compared to people with higher status. For example, for Sweden, Gerdtham (1997) found 
a positive income effect on the probability of visiting a physician but not on the frequency of 
physician visits, using data from 1991 and controlling for need of health care. Based on data 
from 2000, Van Doorslaer et al. (2006) confirmed the result for the probability of at least one 
physician  visit  during  a  year,  but  also  found  an  income  effect  on  the  average  number  of 
physician visits. Similarly, Whitehead et al. (1997) found that controlling for need, manual 
workers were less likely then professionals to visit a physician. Using Swedish data for 1998-
2000, Haglund et al. (2004) found socioeconomic inequalities in access to cardiac procedures 
for  men,  but  not  for  women,  and  also  that  males  were  1.5  times  more  likely  to  undergo 
revascularization procedures than females, after controlling for confounding factors. In contrast, 
Löfvendahl et al. (2005) found that the only socio-economic factor with a significant impact on 
waiting time for orthopedic surgery was employment.  
 5 
   
3 Institutional framework 
3.1 Sick leave and sick-listing 
Sweden has a mandatory social insurance, managed by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 
which provides financial security in case of sickness and disability when the work capacity of 
the insured is reduced by at least 25%. Depending on how much the work capacity is reduced, 
individuals are entitled to be on sick leave 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% of full time, where full time 
corresponds to eight hours a day, five days per week.
5
 Employers pay earnings compensation 
from the second day until the fourteenth day of sickness, after which point the national social 
insurance compensates the person. The employer's contribution for sickness insurance charge 
(calculated on the sum of salaries and benefits paid) was 8.80% in 2001 and 2002, and 11.03% 
in 2003. The contribution was uniform across the country and did not depend on different 
utilization  of  the  insurance  among  companies  and  regions.  Sick  individuals  receive  a 
compensation  of  80%  of  their  income  up  to  a  monthly  salary  income  of  SEK  23,700 
(approximately € 2,600).
6
 Additionally, two and a half of the nearly four million employees in 
Sweden, mainly manual, service and health care workers in the public and private sectors, are 
covered  by  collective  agreements,  covering  10%  of  expected  forgone  earnings,  which 
supplements benefits from the social insurance. 
In order to get sickness benefits when unable to work due to disease or injury, a medical 
certificate issued by a physician is required after seven days of self certification. All physicians 
in Sweden are entitled to issue sick-listing certificates. 
                                                 
5
 Thus,  individuals’  sickness  absence  can  never  exceed  a  normal  full  time,  even  if  their  scheduled 
working hours exceeds a normal full time. 
6
 From 1998 to June 2003, the benefit level was 80% of benefit-qualifying income (i.e., expected yearly 
earnings from employment) up to an income ceiling of 7.5 times the price base amount. Since 1 July 
2003, a lower benefit level of 77.6% has been used. There is also a lower limit for the compensation 
stating that the annual earned income is estimated to be a minimum of 24 per cent of the price base 
amount. In 2002, the price base amount equaled SEK 37,900. 6 
   
3.2 Health care and waiting lists 
Health care in Sweden is nearly exclusively publicly provided. In 2002, private expenditure 
accounted for only 1.6% of the total non-dental non-pharmaceutical health care expenditure 
(Socialstyrelsen, 2006). The main responsibility for health care provision in Sweden rests on 21 
directly elected regional authorities, which finance more than two-thirds of their expenditure by 
proportional labor income taxes. The central government has some influence over the health 
care  system.  One  source  of  influence  is  the  governmental  grants,  which  sometimes  are 
conditioned on actions by the regional authorities, and another source of influence is the central 
government's legislative power over health care. During 1997-2005, the central government 
used  its  influence  to  negotiate  an  appointment  guarantee  with  the  regional  authorities.  The 
guarantee stated that patients must be offered help from the primary care within one day, either 
in the form of a visit or by phone consultation, and that they must not wait more than seven days 
before  seeing  a  doctor.  Those  in  need  of  specialist  treatment  must  be  guaranteed  to  see  a 
specialist within 90 days. The appointment guarantee did however not establish any time limits 
regarding actual treatment (Nordgren, 2006). If the regional authorities could not meet these 
requirements, the patient had the right to, at the cost of the authority, seek health care elsewhere, 
including  at  private  health  care  providers  contracted  by  a  regional  authority  (Proposition 
1997/98:189). Urgent cases are always prioritized, and emergent cases are treated immediately. 
4 Theoretical model 
The  purpose  of this  model  is to analyze  workers'  demand  for  sick  leave in a  labor supply 
perspective and especially how this relates to waiting times for health care. This is used as a 
point of departure when deriving the empirical specification. 
A general health production function can be written 
( , , ), h h X = σ σ σ σ q       (1) 
where h is health status, which take high values for good health. The vector  1 2 ( , ,..., ) n σ σ σ = σ σ σ σ  
describes  n  negative  health  shocks  (like  diseases  and  accidents)  that  the  individual  has 7 
   
experienced.  1 2 ( , ,..., ) n q q q = q  denotes a  vector  of the experienced  waiting  times  for  the n 
health  shocks,  including  truncated  waiting  times.  Waiting  time  is  defined  as  the  time  that 
elapses between experiencing a health shock and receiving a treatment. Hence, the vectors σ σ σ σ  
and  q  could  be  replaced  by σ σ σ σ  and  a  vector  of  received  treatments.
7
 Note  that  the  health 
production function captures the fact that health shocks and waiting times can affect the change 
in health status not only when they are experienced but also later on. Lastly, X is a vector of 
personal and job characteristics.  
We assume that worker utility depends on health, h, consumption, b, leisure, z, and the 
vector of personal and job characteristics, X. Thus, the direct utility function can be written 
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿,￿,￿,￿￿.                                                         (2) 
The utility function is assumed to be characterized by / 0 u b ∂ ∂ > , ￿u/￿z ￿ 0, ￿u/￿h ￿ 0, 
￿u2/￿z￿h ￿ 0
, 
2 2 / 0 u b ∂ ∂ < ,  ￿u2/￿2z ￿ 0 ,
2 / 0 u b h ∂ ∂ ∂ > ,  and 
2 / 0. u b z ∂ ∂ ∂ > By 
normalizing the time endowment to unity, leisure can be defined as  1 z l a = − + , where l is the 
number of scheduled working hours and a is sick leave.
8,9 Sick time (a) must be deducted from, 
and therefore cannot exceed, the scheduled number of working hours.  
The budget constraint is defined as 
(1 ) , wl y wa b δ + − − =       (3) 
where w is the wage rate, y denotes income from non-labor sources, and δ  is the share of the 
wage the worker receives when absent. By substituting for h, b, and z in the utility function (2), 
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The effect of health shocks and waiting times on health status of course differs depending on the type of 
health shock. For health shocks for which treatments are not necessary or preferable, waiting times can 
even have no effect on health status, yet in the analyses below we focus on health shocks for which 
treatments are preferred. 
8
Note that we use a wide definition of leisure including all time except working time, irrespective of 
whether the time is spent in bed recovering or enjoying free time. Also, note that a only includes absence 
due to sickness and not all absence, which is what is analyzed in many previous papers. 
9
Unlike standing in a physical line, being on waiting list does not consume the patients time. Hence, the 
waiting times do not enter the time restriction, but can, as discussed below, affect worker's demand for 
absence. 8 
   
using equations (1) and (3) and the time constraint, the first order condition for worker absence 







= − − + =
∂ ∂ ∂
      (4) 








∂  can depend, besides on a , on w, l, y, σ σ σ σ , q , and X. Thus, 
the demand function for sick leave can be written as  
  ( , , , , , ), a a c l X µ = σ σ σ σ q       (5) 
that is, as a function of the individual’s potential income (￿ ￿ wl ￿ y), the cost of absence 
( ) (1 ) , c w δ = − health shocks (such as diseases and accidents) the individual has experienced, 
experienced waiting times and various individual characteristics.
10
 
To illustrate how the demand for absence depends on ￿, c, l, and one of the waiting 
times,  1 q , we differentiate equation (4) with respect to a and one of these variables at a time. 
Letting ζ  denote the differential of equation (4) with respect to a, which is negative given that 
the worker's objective function is concave in a, we obtain the following expressions: 





z b b c da
dµ ζ
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ −
= >       (6) 





b z b b c a a da
dc ζ
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − +
= <     (7) 
   
2 2 2 2
2 2
0,
u u u u
b z z b z b c c w w da
dl ζ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − + + −
= >     (8) 





u h u h
b h q z h q c da
dq ζ
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −
= >       (9) 
These derivatives describe the situation for those whose utility would be unaffected by a 
marginal change in absence; not for those who, e.g., are unable to work because of severe illness 
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 By defining potential income and cost for absence, we follow, e.g., Johansson and Brännäs (1998) and 
Johansson and Palme (2002). 9 
   
or accidents. Note that all four derivatives are signed, stating that the demand for sick leave, 
ceteris paribus, is increasing in ￿, l, and  1 q , but decreasing in c. These conclusive results are 
partly explained by the fact that potential income ￿, unlike wage, only has income effects on 
the demand for absence. The substitution effects associated with the wage are instead captured 
by the cost for absence, c, and therefore appear in equation (7). 
The numerator of equation (6) includes two income effects: The first term states that 
higher potential income increases the demand for absence by reducing the marginal utility of 
consumption, which makes the cost of absence, c, less important for the individual. The second 
term states that higher potential income increases the demand for absence by increasing the 
marginal utility of leisure, given our assumption that leisure and consumption are complements. 
The two income effects occur also in equation (7), but now with opposite signs compared to in 
equation (6) and multiplied with a since a higher c decreases the income for those with absence. 
In addition, equation (7) contains a substitution effect stating that a higher cost for absence, 
caused  by  a  higher  wage or  a lower replacement  rate,  reduces the  demand  for  absence by 
making it more expensive. Equation (8) also contains the two income effects, now multiplied by 
w, as well as two terms describing how an increase in number of scheduled working hours, 
through  its  effects  on the  marginal  utility  of  income  and  leisure,  increases  the  demand  for 
absence. 
Lastly, equation (9) illustrates that a prolonged waiting time, by its negative effect on 
health, increases the demand for absence since it decreases the marginal utility of consumption 
and since it increases the marginal utility of leisure, or in other words, increases the marginal 
disutility of work. Thus, the theoretical model suggests that prolonged waiting times increases 
the demand for sick leave (and implicitly, the duration of sick leave), ceteris paribus, if waiting 
times have negative effects on health; if the marginal utility of consumption decreases with 
sickness, and if sickness increases the marginal disutility of work. These conditions are, under 
reasonable conditions, fulfilled. As already mentioned, prolonged waiting times might prolong 10 
   
the  recovery  period  after  treatment  (Oudhoff  et  al.,  2007).  Viscusi  and  Evans  (1990)  and 
Gilleskie  (1998)  report  evidence  that  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption  decreases  with 
sickness. Lastly, the idea that sickness increases the marginal disutility of work is perhaps the 
main reason to why sickness insurances exist. Note that duration of sick leave depends not only 
on the demand for sick leave discussed in this section, but also on the rules regarding sick leave. 
In fact, these rules enhance the likelihood of a positive effect of waiting times on sick leave 
durations, since longer waiting times (by their negative effect on health) can entitle people who 
prefer to be on sick leave irrespective of health status to be on sick leave. Thus, the rules imply 
that there can be a positive effect of waiting times on sick leave durations even if the marginal 
utilities of consumption and leisure are unaffected by health. 
Given this labor supply model, which incorporates waiting for health care, the next step 
is to derive empirical specifications for work absence, and to estimate the impact of waiting for 
health care on the duration of sick leave.  
5 Data 
The sample analyzed comes from the RFV-HALS database, which has two components: the 
Swedish  Social  Insurance  Agency  (SSIA)  register  (RFV-LS  database)  and  a  large  survey 
conducted by Statistics Sweden (SCB) in collaboration with the SSIA. 
The  RFV-LS  database  was  created  to  analyze  spells  of  sickness  benefit,  causes  of 
sickness and early-retirement, as well as the effects of the social insurance system, including 
rehabilitation activities, on individuals and society. It includes exact dates when sickness spells 
began  and  ended,  as  well  as  the  states  before  and  after  sickness  (work,  education, 
unemployment,  temporary  or  permanent  disability,  etc.).  It  also  contains  information  about 
individual  characteristics  (such  as  age,  marital  status,  etc.),  the  job  (employer’s  type, 
occupation), the social insurance (local and regional office, the source of money, etc), and the 
type of doctor who evaluated the health status of the employee (generalist, specialist, private, 11 
   
company doctor, or “other”). The database also contains information about the sickness history 
the year before (number of compensated cases and the durations of completed spells). 
The aim of the SCB-SSIA survey was to generate more  knowledge concerning the 
overall situation of sick-listed individuals, with a focus on individuals' assessments and opinions 
about sick leave and returning to work. There are also questions about the patients’ contact with 
the health care system. A questionnaire was sent to a random sample of 10,799 persons aged 20-
64 years who started a spell of sick leave lasting at least 15 days during 14-27 January 2002. 
The questionnaire was sent out in April-May 2002, and 6,171 persons answered. Given the 
focus of our theoretical model, we decided to analyze only the employed respondents (5,087 
persons). Moreover, we analyze only those employees who answered all questions that could be 
connected  to  our  theoretical  model,  reducing  the  sample  analyzed  in  this  paper  to  3,653 
observations. Table A1 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in 
the empirical analysis, for the whole sample, and by waiting for the health care. Below we 
discuss the dependent variable and the waiting time variables. The other variables are briefly 
described in the next section and µ and c are defined in detail in the Appendix. 
The dependent variable in this study is the censored duration of sick leave spells (that 
started 14-27 January 2002), measured in days, and the status of each spell on 12 February, 
2003. About 18% of all analyzed spells are censored, which show a relatively high number of 
cases longer than one year. The average (censored) duration of sick leave is 129.20 days, while 
the median is 58 days.  
The waiting time dummy variables describe the waiting time (intervals) experienced 
during the analyzed sick leave for five categories: primary care or a general practitioner (GP), 
technical  investigation,  specialists,  surgery,  and  other  interventions.  For  each  category  the 
respondents indicated whether they had waited one week or less, two to three weeks, four to 
seven weeks, eight weeks or more, or that they did not need the health service in question (this 
last category is used as a comparison group in the empirical analysis). Table A1 shows that two-
thirds  of  the  sample  were  in  need  of  primary  care,  while  only  15%  needed  surgery.  The 12 
   
proportions of respondents who waited two weeks or more for the different types of health care 
range from 11% for surgery to 26% for specialists. Only 5% waited more than four weeks for 
primary care, while the figure for specialists was 17%.  
Descriptive statistics for waiting time for health care variables (reported in Table A1) 
show that in some cases (about 5%), people waited for health care (specialist, surgery, or other 
interventions) longer than the duration of their sick leave. Unfortunately, we do not know if this 
happen before or after the analyzed sick leave ended. However, given that the data contain 
information on whether the person was in good health when the spell ended, this might be 
interpreted as good evidence that the employees might have worked when waiting for health 
care services. The employees might have recovered part of the loss in their work capacity and 
worked (at least part-time) while waiting for a new intervention. It might also be that they 
started to wait before the sick leave started, received the health care service, continued with 
some days of sick leave, and then returned to work. 
A problem related to the waiting time variables is that we cannot be sure about how the 
respondents interpreted the questions about waiting times. It is possible that some respondents 
understood the questions to mean that the part of the waiting time experienced before or after 
the sick leave spell should be ignored when answering. If this is the case and if some of the 
people interpreting the questions this way returned to work while waiting for treatment, it would 
introduce an endogeneity problem. The only thing the data can tell us about this is that not 
everybody interpreted the questions this way, since, as discussed above, about 5% reported 
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 To get an idea of the importance of this potential problem, we also estimate specification 6 only for 
those with durations exceeding 140 days, who most likely had still ongoing sick leave durations when 
answering the survey. For individuals with an ongoing spell at this time, an endogeneity problem cannot 
exist unless they take into account their expectations of remaining waiting times and sick leave when 
answering the questions. However, for these individuals, the estimates for waiting times will only capture 
how waiting times affect absence after the end of the waiting times. Compared with the results presented 
in  Tables  1a-1c,  the  estimates  for  these  1,084  individuals  indicate  a  smaller  impact  of  waiting  for 
specialists or another type of intervention, while the estimates of the other three categories of waiting 
times are affected in different directions. 13 
   
6 Empirical specifications 
Cox’s  proportional  hazards  model  (1972)  is  used  in  order  to  estimate  the  “conditional 
probability”  of  returning  to  work  in  a  given  period.  The  demand  function  for  sick  leave 
(equation 5 of the theoretical model) suggests that the demand for sick leave, and implicitly sick 
leave  durations,  should  depend  on  the  potential  income,  the  cost  of  absence,  number  of 
scheduled working hours, health shocks, waiting times, and personal and job characteristics. We 
include variables that measure, or at least serve as proxies for, the factors that the theoretical 
model suggests might affect absence. We also include dummy variables for regional social 
insurance offices, which are expected to reveal the existence of regional general guidelines of 
sicklisting and different norms regarding sick leave in the various regions. 
Our  starting  point  is  the  traditional  “labor  supply”  specification  that  includes  the 
economic variables µ, c, and l (Table 1a). Then, we proceed in specifications 2-5 by adding 
groups of demographic (2), health-related (3), regional (4), and work-related (5) variables used 
in other previous studies and/or expected to affect the duration of sick leave. The purpose is to 
study whether (and how) these variables affect the estimates of the traditional labor supply 
variables.  In  specification  6,  we  include  our  variables  of  special  interest,  the  waiting  time 
dummies, and test the robustness of their impact (Table 1b) by excluding one by one the groups 
of variables (specifications 7-11). Note that this estimation strategy implies that the estimates 
for the waiting time variables will capture the total impact of these variables, i.e., both the 
impact of waiting for health care and the impact of having waited for health care. 
µ is measured as the income used for calculating the sickness allowance. It is a good 
proxy of the potential labor income, based on current or earlier earnings, but does not include 
non-labor income. c measures the income loss per week of absence. To account for number of 
scheduled working hours, l, we include both the normal number of scheduled working hours 
before the start of the sick leave absence, wh, and Worked more than contracted hours, which is 
a dummy variable taking the value one for individuals who worked overtime before the start of 
their sick leave absence. We also include an interaction term between c and wh to test whether 14 
   
the impact of cost of absence on the duration of absence depends on the normal number of 
scheduled working hours.  
The demographic variables included are Women, Age, Widowed, and Divorced. We 
tested to include polynomials for age and economic variables and interactions between Age and 
Women,  but  these  variables  had  no  statistically  significant  parameters  and  are  therefore 
excluded. 
The  sickness-related  variables  include:  the  number  and  length  of  patients  sickness 
history in recent years (i.e., the length of all spells finished in 2001; there were several ongoing 
spells on 1 January 2001, that had started up to seven years earlier); dummy variables for the 
diagnosis for which the worker was sick listed; and a dummy variable for the type of physician 
who sick listed the worker. The idea is that these should serve as proxies for health shocks 
experienced by the workers and thus account for some of the variation in health that is not 
caused by different waiting times. The work-related variables include indicators on whether the 
employer is a private company, a municipality, a regional government, the central government, 
or another public authority of another type, where private company is used as control group. We 
also include indicator variables for the formal training required for the job.
12
 The variables 
included are not perfect measures of the factors suggested by the theoretical model, meaning 
that the estimates may capture other mechanisms than those described in the theoretical model. 
For example, sickness history, diagnosis, type of physician, and waiting times do not capture all 
the variation in health. Therefore, also estimates for other variables might capture effects of 
health on the duration of absence. Instead of attempting to isolate causal effects, we will in the 
                                                 
12
The first skill level comprises jobs requiring only primary education, such as cleaners, factory workers, 
and school meal assistants. The second skill level represents jobs requiring secondary education, e.g., 
assistant nurses, cashiers, and shop assistants. The third skill level represents jobs that require a three-year 
university  education,  e.g.,  nurses,  technicians,  and  administrative  officers.  The  fourth  skill  level 
comprises  jobs  requiring  four  years  or  more  of  university  education  and  an  academic  degree,  e.g., 
psychologist,  personnel  manager,  and  teacher  in  secondary  education.  The  occupational  titles  were 
classified into broadly similar categories in order to make sure the case group and the control group were 
comparable. The Swedish National Standard for Classification of Skill Levels (SSYK 1996) was used for 
this purpose (SCB, http://www.scb.se/Pages/List____259304.aspx). This national system is based on an 
international classification system, ISCO-88, and introduces the concept of skill, defined as the degree of 
complexity of constituent tasks and skill specialization. 15 
   
results section discuss which other effects the estimates for the traditional economic variables 
and the waiting time variables may capture.  
We have chosen this approach instead of an instrumental variable approach since the 
requirements for the sets of instruments that would be needed to estimate the model using 
instrumental  variable  techniques  are  very  demanding  due  to  of  the  number  of  possibly 
endogenous variables and the fact that many variables, e.g., waiting times, might have different 
impact on different individuals’ sick leave durations. This heterogeneity implies that even if we 
find a set of instruments that fulfill the statistical requirements for valid and strong instruments, 
these instruments might capture variations in the variables that are unrepresentative in terms of 
the effect on durations. To judge whether this is a serious problem in our empirical setting, we 
would need several sets of valid instruments.
13 
7 Results 
The results from the Cox regression models are shown in Tables 1a-1c. Table 1a presents a 
summary of specifications 1-6, reporting the estimates for only the traditional economic and 
demographic variables of the labor supply model. Table 1b presents the estimates for the health 
variables (sickness history and diagnosis), and Table 1c presents the estimates for the waiting 
time variables. The other results are available from the authors upon request. The results are 
presented as hazard rates, where a value above one indicates a positive impact on recovery, i.e., 
shorter spells. 
The estimates for Worked more than contracted hours in specifications 1-5 indicate that 
those working overtime had 10-20% longer spells than others. The effect of this variable is, 
however, reduced by about one-third (about one standard error) when the waiting time variables 
are added. Since the parameter of this variable is reduced by nearly as much when the sickness 
variables are added in specification 3, a likely explanation to the changed estimates is that it 
                                                 
13
 When  the  effect  of  an  endogenous  variable  is  heterogeneous,  different  instrument  variables  will 
generally result in different parameters being estimated (see e.g., Heckman et al., 2006, and reference 
therein). Also, Stock and Yogo (2005) show that the instruments must be quite strong in order to obtain 
good estimates using instrumental-variable regression. 16 
   
reflects that those working overtime on average had more long-lasting types of sicknesses.
14
 The 
impacts of the other economic variables are in all specifications small and not significant at the 
5% level. In the first two specifications, c and c*wh are significant at the 10% level. Together, 
these estimates suggest that c reduces the absence spells for all but the 6-7% of the workers with 
more than 42-43 weekly contracted hours. That the estimates for ￿ are insignificant may be 
explained by a positive association between income and health, which counteracts the positive 
causal effect that potential income is expected to have on absence.
15
 
Looking a bit more closely at how the estimates changed when waiting time variables 
were added, we see that the largest change, besides for overtime, is for women. The impact of 
being a woman went from reducing spells by 3%, to increasing them by 3%. As for overtime, 
this change is about one standard error and thus not significantly different from  zero. One 
possible interpretation is that men on sick leave on average are sicker than women on sick leave, 
and that this is partly captured by the waiting time variables. Another interpretation is that men 
have to wait longer for treatment than women, ceteris paribus. 
Table 1b shows, among other things, that workers sick listed due to of mental disorders 
have the longest sick leave durations, controlling for the other variables. Turning to the waiting 
time variables reported in Table 1c, we see that waiting one week or less instead of not waiting 
at  all  only  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  duration  of  sick  leave  for  surgery  and  other 
interventions. The estimates also show that waiting more than two weeks for health care has 
significantly  positive  impacts  on  the  duration  of  sick  leave.  One  exception  is  waiting  for 
surgery, where people waiting more than four weeks actually have significantly shorter spells 
than others. One interpretation is that waiting times is used more as a mean of prioritizing in 
surgery than in the other fields of health care, so that those with long waiting times for surgery 
                                                 
14
 Estimation results, not reported but available from the authors upon request, show that it is mainly the 
inclusion  of  diagnosis  dummies  that  explains  the  different  estimates  for  working  overtime  in 
specifications 2 and 3. 
15
 Suhrcke et al. (2006) report that several empirical studies demonstrate that poor health is associated 
with decreases in wages and earnings. 17 
   
are  those  with  less  severe  conditions.  The  positive  impacts  might  also  be  explained  by 
unobserved heterogeneity in health if some have to wait longer for treatment because their 
conditions are more severe and their treatments therefore require more planning.  
The estimates also suggest that waiting to see a specialist prolongs the sick leave spells 
more than do the other categories of waiting, at least if you wait more than four weeks. For 
waiting for a specialist, we also see a pattern that the sickness spells increase more and more the 
longer you have to wait. For the other categories, we see the same pattern when comparing 
those waiting two-three weeks with those waiting one week or less, but not when comparing 
those waiting more than four weeks with those waiting two-three weeks.
16
 The estimates for the 
waiting time are fairly robust against exclusion of the other variable groups. Not surprisingly, 
exclusion of the sickness variables has the largest effect on the estimated impact on the waiting 
time variables. 
                                                 
16
 One explanation to why the estimated impacts of the long waiting times are not even longer could be 
that the length of the remaining waiting time does not affect the sick leave durations for those still waiting 
when returning to work; e.g., an increase in waiting time from four to eight weeks should not affect the 
probability of returning to work before the fourth week of waiting. If this explanation is important and if 
many individuals started to wait for health care at the beginning of their sick leave duration, we would 
expect to get more negative estimates for waiting times exceeding three weeks after recoding waiting 
times exceeding three weeks as waiting two-three weeks during the first three weeks of absence and 
recoding waiting times exceeding seven weeks as waiting four-seven weeks during the first seven weeks 
of absence. However, re-estimating specification 6 after this recoding yielded nearly identical results as 




 Table 1a Cox proportional hazards estimates: economic and demographic parameters 
 
  (1)    (2)   
  (3) 
  (4) 
  (5) 
  (6) 
 
Weekly cost of being absent (c) in SEK 1000  1.209 
*  1.180 
*    1.141 
   1.135 
   1.147 
   1.158 
  
Weekly contracted hours (wh) in 10 hours  1.025 
   1.005 
     1.005 
   1.010 
   1.009 
   1.018 
  
c*wh  0.996 
*  0.996 
*    0.997 
   0.997 
   0.997 
   0.996 
  
Worked more than contracted hours (=1; otherwise=0)  0.889 
***  0.843 
***    0.877 
***  0.878 
***  0.878 
***  0.920 
* 
µ in SEK 10,000  per month  0.993 
   1.023 
     1.028 
   1.051 
   1.001 
   0.988 
  
Woman (CG: Man)      0.987 
    1.002 
   1.004 
   1.029 
   0.971 
  
Age      0.987 
***    0.989 
***  0.989 
***  0.990 
***  0.990 
*** 
Widowed      1.438 
***    1.474 
***  1.506 
***  1.515 
***  1.405 
** 
Divorced      1.009 
    1.039 
   1.045 
   1.043 
   1.052 
  
Sickness (history; diagnosis; physician)        
  YES 
  YES 
  YES 
  YES 
 
Regional social insurance offices         
   
  YES 
  YES 
  YES 
 
Work (sector; educational requirement)         
   
   
  YES 
  YES 
 
Waiting list dummies         
   
   
   
  YES 
 
LR chi2(g)  11.6 
**  80.3 
***    816.3 
***  876.4 
***  898.4 
***  1247.4 
*** 
g  5   9     29   49 
  58   78 
 
Pseudolikelihood  -22842.7   -22812.2     -22582.7   -22558.8 
  -22547.5    -22341.7 
 
Notes: CG stands for comparison group. Hazard ratio >1 means a higher risk for longer absence. The estimate is significant at the 10% level (*), at the 5% level (**), 





Table 1b Cox proportional hazards estimates: sickness and job parameters  
 
  (3) 
  (4) 
  (5) 
  (6) 
 
Economic incentives  YES 
  YES 
  YES 
  YES 
 
Demographics  YES 
  YES 
  YES 
  YES 
 
Regional SI offices dummies   
  YES 
  YES 
  YES 
 
Waiting list dummies   
   
   
  YES 
 
Number of spells 2001  0.930 
***  0.931 
***  0.931 
***  0.944 
*** 
Number of spells ending 2001   
   
   
   
 
1-14 days  1.035 
**  1.036 
**  1.038 
**  1.063 
*** 
15-28 days  1.007 
   1.006 
   1.004 
   1.040 
  
29-59 days  0.938 
**  0.939 
**  0.941 
*  0.956 
  
60-89 days  0.999 
   1.003 
   0.998 
   0.983 
  
90-179 days  0.856 
***  0.858 
***  0.856 
***  0.874 
*** 
180-364 days  0.810 
***  0.802 
***  0.793 
***  0.805 
*** 
1-2 years  0.993 
   1.030 
   1.004 
   1.042 
  
2-3 years  1.127 
   1.165 
   1.174 
   1.246 
  
3-4 years  1.789 
**  1.989 
**  1.949 
**  1.298 
  
4-6 years  3.245 
***  2.987 
***  2.765 
***  2.858 
*** 
Diagnosis (CG: Injuries and poisoning)   
   
   
   
 
Mental disorder  0.610 
***  0.602 
***  0.603 
***  0.552 
*** 
Circulatory system  0.679 
***  0.663 
***  0.659 
***  0.648 
*** 
Respiratory system  2.353 
***  2.380 
***  2.426 
***  2.278 
*** 
Musculoskeletal  0.794 
***  0.788 
***  0.782 
***  0.833 
*** 
Other  0.970 
   0.960 
   0.945 
   0.873 
** 
Physician (CG: Primary care)   
   
   
   
 
Company  0.704 
***  0.688 
***  0.681 
***  0.675 
*** 
Private   0.888 
*  0.861 
**  0.850 
***  0.823 
*** 
Specialist  1.013 
   0.999 
   0.990 
   1.016 
  
Not specified  1.506 
   1.429 
   1.435 
   1.346 
  
Employer (CG: Private)   
   
   
   
 
Municipality   
   
  0.886 
**  0.907 
** 
Regional   
   
  1.002 
   0.994 
  
State   
   
  1.065 
   1.073 
  
Other public authority   
   
  0.745 
*  0.762 
* 
Other employer   
   
  0.921 
   0.930 
  
Educational requirement (CG: Occupation with very 
low or no requirements)   
   
   
   
 
High school   
   
  1.167 
*  1.161 
* 
High school +   
   
  1.260 
**  1.260 
** 
College/university   
   
  1.186 
*  1.177 
* 
Leadership occupation   
   
  0.976 
   0.928 
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Table 1c Cox proportional hazards estimates: waiting times parameters 
 
  (6) 
  (7)    (8)    (9)    (10)    (11)   
Economic incentives  YES 
  YES    YES    YES 
  YES    -   
Demographics  YES 
  YES    YES    YES 
  -    -   
Sickness (history; diagnosis; physician)  YES 
  YES   YES   - 
  -   -  
Regional social insurance offices  YES 
  YES   -   - 
  -   -  
Work (sector; educational requirement)  YES 
  -   -   - 
  -   -  
Waiting for primary care or a GP (CG: not)   
                     
1 week or less  0.987 
   0.984 
   0.992 
   0.991 
   1.002 
   1.010   
2-3 weeks  0.728 
***  0.722 
***  0.723 
***  0.711 
***  0.723 
***  0.729 
*** 
4-7 weeks  0.761 
***  0.745 
***  0.742 
***  0.707 
***  0.695 
***  0.700 
*** 
8 weeks or more  0.763 
   0.757 
   0.747 
   0.821 
   0.852 
   0.859 
  
Waiting for a technical investigation (CG: 
not)   
                     
1 week or less  0.910 
   0.904 
   0.902 
   1.054 
   1.040 
   1.040 
  
2-3 weeks  0.650 
***  0.647 
***  0.637 
***  0.747 
***  0.716 
***  0.717 
*** 
4-7 weeks  0.692 
***  0.689 
***  0.678 
***  0.730 
***  0.705 
***  0.707 
*** 
8 weeks or more  0.649 
***  0.639 
***  0.628 
***  0.663 
***  0.653 
***  0.657 
*** 
Waiting for a specialist (CG: not)   
                     
1 week or less  0.757 
***  0.764 
***  0.779 
***  0.727 
***  0.749 
***  0.741 
*** 
2-3 weeks  0.679 
***  0.683 
***  0.686 
***  0.584 
***  0.598 
***  0.593 
*** 
4-7 weeks  0.618 
***  0.619 
***  0.632 
***  0.568 
***  0.588 
***  0.582 
*** 
8 weeks or more  0.609 
***  0.621 
***  0.634 
***  0.542 
***  0.559 
***  0.557 
*** 
Waiting for a surgery (CG: not)   
                     
1 week or less  0.952 
   0.963 
   0.977 
   1.094 
   1.068 
   1.066 
  
2-3 weeks  0.749 
**  0.752 
**  0.746 
**  0.866 
   0.836 
   0.840 
  
4-7 weeks  1.354 
***  1.298 
**  1.260 
**  1.492 
***  1.422 
***  1.406 
*** 
8 weeks or more  1.215 
**  1.225 
**  1.240 
**  1.387 
***  1.364 
***  1.366 
*** 
Waiting for another type of intervention (CG: 
not)   
                     
1 week or less  0.786 
***  0.788 
***  0.774 
***  0.755 
***  0.759 
***  0.762 
*** 
2-3 weeks  0.692 
***  0.689 
***  0.686 
***  0.687 
***  0.679 
***  0.676 
*** 
4-7 weeks  0.742 
***  0.743 
***  0.726 
***  0.699 
***  0.691 
***  0.694 
*** 
8 weeks or more  0.644 
***  0.640 
***  0.644 
***  0.671 
***  0.659 
***  0.660 
*** 
   
                     
LR chi2(g)  1247.4 
  1221.6   1183.9   516.3   424.7   420.0   
G  78 
  69   49   29   25   20   
Pseudolikelihood  -22342 




8 Conclusions  
In  this  paper  we  have  analyzed  the  impact  of  waiting  times  for  health  care  on  sick  leave 
duration.  The  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  register  and  survey  data  for  3,653  Swedish 
employees and performed using Cox's proportional hazards model. The results show positive 
significant impacts of waiting times on duration of sick leave. Waiting two to three weeks 
instead of one week or less has a large impact on the duration, yet waiting even longer is found 
to be only weakly associated with sick leave duration. One interpretation is that waiting two to 
three weeks or waiting even longer to a large extent reflects successful prioritization where 
those who are able to work while waiting for health care have received the longest waiting 
times, while waiting longer or shorter than two weeks is less related to the individuals' need for 
care. That we control for, e.g., diagnoses and a rich set of variables describing sickness history 
should reduce the influence of unobserved heterogeneity in health on the estimates, but still 
does not allow us to interpret the estimates as causal effects. More research is therefore needed 
on the effect of waiting times for health care on sick leave. To assure that causal effects are 
estimated, future research should preferably use experimental data on waiting times or data 
where  natural  experiments  regarding  waiting  times  can  be  employed  to  identify  the  causal 
effect. To be able to separately estimate the effect of ongoing waiting and the effect of past 
waiting time, future research should preferably also use data where the exact timing of not only 
the sick leave but also of the waiting periods is observed. 
Previous research has found evidence on socioeconomic inequality in the utilization of 
health care in Sweden (Gerdtham, 1997; Whitehead et al., 1997; Gerdtham and Sundberg, 1998; 
Burström, 2002; Haglund et al., 2004; Van Doorslaer, Masseria and Koolman, 2006). We had 
therefore  expected  that  controlling  for  waiting  times  would  affect  the  estimates  for,  e.g., 
potential income, yet controlling for waiting times did not have any major influence on the 
estimates for the traditional labor supply variables. This indicates that there is no large income 
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Definition of some variables 
µ is defined as the benefit-qualifying income (SGI), expressed in SEK 10,000 per month, used 
by  the  Swedish  Social  Insurance  Agency  to  calculate  sickness  allowance.  The  variable  is 
intended to equal the labor income that individuals would have if they were not absent from 
work due to sickness. 
Weekly cost of being absent (c) is expressed in thousands of SEK and is calculated as 
c=  10*[(1-δ)  (µ*12/52)+  D*(µ*12  –  28.425)/52],  where  28.425  is  the  ceiling  of  sickness 
insurance, in SEK 10,000, over which no compensation is given, and D is a dummy variable 
equal to one if µ> 28.425 and zero otherwise. As mentioned previously, the ceiling corresponds 
to a monthly income of nearly SEK 23,700. The multiplication by 10 is explained by the fact 
that we want to express c in SEK 1000 but SGI in SEK 10,000. δ is the share of the wage the 
worker receives when absent and equals 80% from the social insurance plus an additional 10% 
guaranteed through collective agreements for nearly all employees between the 15
th and 90
th day 
of absence. Municipal and county employees as well as blue collar workers and low-income 
workers who are privately employed get the extra 10% up to their 365
th day of absence.
17 That 
the compensation levels change, means that some employees have different values for the cost 
of absence, c. To deal with this, we split the data on the 90
th and 365
th day of absence, so that we 
can get multiple observations for those with long sick leave durations. c is the only variable that 
can differ across observations for an individual. 
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(2) vs (3) 
    Mean Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
                
Weekly cost of being absent (c) in SEK 1000  0.668  (0.949)  0.664  (0.955)  0.684  (0.921)     -0.5 
  
Weekly contracted hours (wh) in 10 hours  3.731  (0.833)       3.724  (0.842)     3.763  (0.789)  -1.1 
  
Worked more than contracted hours   0.269  (0.444)  0.270  (0.444)  0.265  (0.442)  0.2 
  
µ in SEK 10,000  per month  1.878  (0.647)  1.866  (0.648)  1.934  (0.642)  -2.4 
** 
Woman (=1; Man=0)  0.681  (0.466)  0.669  (0.471)  0.736  (0.441)  -3.5 
*** 
Age  44.662  (11.304)  44.64  (11.25)  44.75  (11.57)  -0.2 
  
Marital status               
 
       Married  0.537  (0.499)  0.540  (0.499)  0.526  (0.500)  0.6 
  
Unmarried  0.312  (0.463)  0.311  (0.463)  0.314  (0.464)  -0.1 
  
Widowed  0.017  (0.129)  0.015  (0.123)  0.025  (0.156)  -1.5 
  
Divorced  0.134  (0.341)  0.134  (0.340)  0.136  (0.343)  -0.1 
  
Regional social insurance office                 
Skåne  0.130  (0.337)  0.131  (0.338)  0.125  (0.331)  0.5 
  
Stockholm  0.187  (0.390)  0.186  (0.389)  0.193  (0.395)  -0.5 
  
Uppsala   0.034  (0.180)  0.034  (0.181)  0.033  (0.178)  0.1 
  
Södermanlands   0.027  (0.162)  0.027  (0.161)  0.028  (0.165)  -0.2 
  
Östergötlands   0.048  (0.214)  0.046  (0.210)  0.056  (0.230)  -1.0 
  
Jönköping  0.038  (0.191)  0.038  (0.191)  0.039  (0.194)  -0.1 
  
Kronoberg  0.019  (0.137)  0.020  (0.139)  0.017  (0.130)  0.4 
  
Kalmar  0.028  (0.165)  0.027  (0.163)  0.031  (0.174)  -0.5 
  
Gotland  0.005  (0.068)  0.006  (0.075)  0.000  (0.000)  4.1 
*** 
Blekinge  0.015  (0.121)  0.013  (0.114)  0.022  (0.146)  -1.4 
  
Halland  0.020  (0.139)  0.019  (0.136)  0.023  (0.151)  -0.7 
  
Västra Götalands   0.159  (0.366)  0.161  (0.368)  0.148  (0.356)  0.8 
  
Värmland  0.030  (0.169)  0.027  (0.163)  0.041  (0.197)  -1.6 
  
Örebro  0.032  (0.175)  0.034  (0.182)  0.020  (0.141)  2.1 
** 
Västmanland  0.033  (0.178)  0.034  (0.180)  0.028  (0.165)  0.7 
  
Dalarna  0.039  (0.194)  0.039  (0.192)  0.042  (0.201)  -0.4 
  
Gävleborg  0.036  (0.186)  0.036  (0.186)  0.036  (0.186)  0.0 
  
Västernorrland  0.030  (0.170)  0.030  (0.171)  0.028  (0.165)  0.3 
  
Jämtland  0.024  (0.152)  0.023  (0.151)  0.025  (0.156)  -0.3 
  
Västerbotten  0.038  (0.190)  0.038  (0.190)  0.037  (0.190)  0.0 
  
Norrbotten  0.031  (0.174)  0.032  (0.177)  0.027  (0.161)  0.8 
  
Employer                
Private    0.438    (0.496)       0.434     (0.496)  0.459  (0.499)  1.1 
 
Municipality  0.327  (0.469)  0.333  (0.471)  0.295  (0.456)  1.9 
* 
Regional  0.096  (0.294)  0.093  (0.290)  0.111  (0.314)  -1.3 
  
State  0.079  (0.270)  0.076  (0.266)  0.090  (0.287)  -1.1 
  
Other public authority  0.022  (0.146)  0.023  (0.150)  0.017  (0.130)  1.0 
  
Other employer  0.039  (0.193)  0.041  (0.198)  0.028  (0.165)  1.7 
* 
Educational requirement                
  
Very low or no requirements               
 
High school  0.561  (0.496)  0.570  (0.495)  0.520  (0.500)  2.3 
** 
High school +  0.158  (0.365)  0.154  (0.361)  0.178  (0.383)  -1.4 
  
College/university  0.191  (0.393)  0.184  (0.387)  0.222  (0.416)  -2.1 
** 
Leadership occupation  0.031  (0.175)  0.030  (0.169)  0.041  (0.197)  -1.3 
  
               
  









Wait for health care 
(2) 
n=3012 




(2) vs (3) 
.    Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev 
Duration (in days)  129.2  (138.0)  140.3  (142.3)  76.9  (100.4)  13.4 
*** 
Not censored 12 February 2003  0.825  (0.380)      0.802  (0.398)      0.933  (0.250)    -10.7 
*** 
                 
Number of spells 2001  0.957  (2.025)  1.038  (2.100)  0.579  (1.567)  6.3 
*** 
Number of spells ending 2001               
 
1-14 days  0.229  (1.112)  0.252  (1.196)  0.119  (0.560)  4.3 
*** 
15-28 days  0.439  (0.782)  0.470  (0.807)  0.292  (0.635)  6.1 
*** 
29-59 days  0.365  (0.690)  0.385  (0.709)  0.270  (0.589)  4.3 
*** 
60-89 days  0.139  (0.397)  0.149  (0.411)  0.090  (0.318)  4.0 
*** 
90-179 days  0.140  (0.409)  0.154  (0.424)  0.073  (0.320)  5.5 
*** 
180-364 days  0.070  (0.293)  0.073  (0.302)  0.053  (0.251)  1.8 
* 
1-2 years  0.042  (0.209)  0.047  (0.223)  0.016  (0.124)  5.0 
*** 
2-3 years  0.010  (0.100)  0.011  (0.103)  0.008  (0.088)  0.7 
  
3-4 years  0.003  (0.055)  0.003  (0.051)  0.005  (0.068)  -0.7 
  
4-6 years  0.000  (0.017)  0.000  (0.018)  0.000  (0.000)  1.0 
  
Diagnosis                
 
Injuries and poisoning  0.089  (0.285)  0.086  (0.280)  0.106  (0.308)  -1.5 
  
Mental disorder  0.192  (0.394)  0.199  (0.399)  0.161  (0.368)  2.3 
** 
Circulatory organs   0.044  (0.205)  0.042  (0.202)  0.050  (0.218)  -0.8 
  
dia_andn  0.065  (0.247)  0.067  (0.250)  0.058  (0.233)  0.9 
  
Musculoskeletal  0.313  (0.464)  0.335  (0.472)  0.212  (0.409)  6.7 
*** 
Other  0.296  (0.457)  0.272  (0.445)  0.413  (0.493)  -6.7 
*** 
Physician                
 
Primary care (GP)  0.446  (0.497)  0.482  (0.500)  0.276  (0.447)  10.3 
*** 
Company  0.113  (0.317)  0.111  (0.314)  0.125  (0.331)  -1.0 
  
Private   0.124  (0.330)  0.125  (0.330)  0.122  (0.327)  0.2 
  
Specialist  0.313  (0.464)  0.280  (0.449)  0.473  (0.500)  -9.0 
*** 
Not specified  0.004  (0.060)  0.003  (0.058)  0.005  (0.068)  -0.5 
  
Waiting for primary care (or GP)                 
1 week or less  0.480  (0.500)  0.582  (0.493)         
2-3 weeks  0.133  (0.340)  0.162  (0.368)         
4-7 weeks  0.038  (0.191)  0.046  (0.210)         
8 weeks or more  0.015  (0.123)  0.019  (0.135)         
Not the case  0.333    (0. 471)  0.192     (0.396)         
Waiting for (technical) investigation                 
1 week or less  0.127  (0.333)  0.154  (0.361)         
2-3 weeks  0.092  (0.289)  0.112  (0.315)         
4-7 weeks  0.080  (0.272)  0.098  (0.297)         
8 weeks or more  0.070  (0.255)  0.085  (0.278)         
Not the case  0.630     (0.483)  0.552     (0.497)         
Waiting for specialist                 
1 week or less  0.120  (0.325)  0.145  (0.352)         
2-3 weeks  0.089  (0.284)  0.108  (0.310)         
4-7 weeks  0.077  (0.267)  0.093  (0.291)         
8 weeks or more  0.099  (0.299)  0.120  (0.325)         
Not the case  0.616    (0.487)  0.534     (0.499)         
Waiting for surgery                 
1 week or less  0.044  (0.204)  0.053  (0.224)         
2-3 weeks  0.020  (0.139)  0.024  (0.153)         
4-7 weeks  0.021  (0.144)  0.026  (0.158)         
8 weeks or more  0.069  (0.253)  0.084  (0.277)         
Not the case  0.847    (0.360)  0.814     (0.389)         
Waiting for other investigation                 
1 week or less  0.125  (0.331)  0.151  (0.358)         
2-3 weeks  0.076  (0.266)  0.093  (0.290)         
4-7 weeks  0.039  (0.195)  0.048  (0.213)         
8 weeks or more  0.055  (0.229)  0.067  (0.250)         
Not the case  0.704     (0.456)  0.641     (0.480)         
Not waiting for health care  0.175  (0.380)             
 